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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
Healthcare spending is a huge chunk of the federal budget. 
Medicare and Medicaid cost roughly a trillion dollars per year. 
And with trillions of dollars comes the temptation for fraud.  
Fraud is a particular danger because doctors and hospitals 
can make lots of money for one another. When doctors refer 
patients to hospitals for services, the hospitals make money. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with that. But when hospi-
tals pay their doctors based on the number or value of their re-
ferrals, the doctors have incentives to refer more. The potential 
for abuse is obvious and requires scrutiny. 
The Stark Act and the False Claims Act work together to 
ensure this scrutiny and safeguard taxpayer funds against 
abuse. The Stark Act forbids hospitals to bill Medicare for cer-
tain services when the hospital has a financial relationship with 
the doctor who asked for those services, unless an exception 
applies. And the False Claims Act gives the government and 
relators a cause of action with which to sue those who violate 
the Stark Act. 
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Here, the relators allege that the defendants have for years 
been billing Medicare for services referred by their neurosur-
geons in violation of the Stark Act. The District Court found 
that the relators had failed to state a plausible claim and dis-
missed their suit. 
This appeal revolves around two questions: First, do the re-
lators offer enough facts to plausibly allege that the surgeons’ 
pay varies with, or takes into account, their referrals? Second, 
who bears the burden of pleading Stark Act exceptions under 
the False Claims Act?  
The answer to the first question is yes. The relators’ com-
plaint alleges enough facts to make out their claim. The relators 
make a plausible case that the surgeons’ pay is so high that it 
must take their referrals into account. All these facts are smoke; 
and where there is smoke, there might be fire. 
The answer to the second question is the defendants. The 
Stark Act’s exceptions work like affirmative defenses in litiga-
tion. The burden of pleading these affirmative defenses lies 
with the defendant. This is true even under the False Claims 
Act. And even if that burden lay with the relators, their plead-
ings meet that burden here. 
We hold that the complaint states plausible violations of 
both the Stark Act and the False Claims Act. So we will re-
verse. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
1. The University of Pittsburgh medical system. On this 
motion to dismiss, we take as true the facts alleged in the sec-
ond amended complaint: The University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center is a multi-billion-dollar nonprofit healthcare enterprise. 
The Medical Center is the parent organization of a whole sys-
tem of healthcare subsidiaries, including twenty hospitals. The 
Medical Center is the sole member (owner) of each hospital. 
More than 2,700 doctors, including dozens of neurosur-
geons, work at these hospitals. The doctors are employed not 
by the hospitals, but by other Medical Center subsidiaries. 
Three of these subsidiaries matter here: University of Pitts-
burgh Physicians; UPMC Community Medicine, Inc.; and Tri-
State Neurological Associates-UPMC, Inc. 
These three subsidiaries employed many of the neurosur-
geons who worked at the Medical Center’s hospitals during the 
years at issue, from 2006 on. Pittsburgh Physicians’ Neurosur-
gery Department employed most of the surgeons at issue. Tri-
State employed two, and Community Medicine employed one. 
The Medical Center owns all three subsidiaries. In short, the 
Medical Center owns both the hospitals and the companies that 
employ the surgeons who work in the hospitals.  
2. The neurosurgeons’ compensation structure. The sur-
geons who worked for the three subsidiaries here all had simi-
lar employment contracts. Each surgeon had a base salary and 
an annual Work-Unit quota. Work Units (or wRVUs) measure 
the value of a doctor’s personal services. Every medical service 
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is worth a certain number of Work Units. The longer and more 
complex the service, the more Work Units it is worth. Work 
Units are one component of Relative Value Units (RVUs). 
RVUs are the basic units that Medicare uses to measure how 
much a medical procedure is worth. 
The surgeons were rewarded or punished based on how 
many Work Units they generated. If a surgeon failed to meet 
his yearly quota, his employer could lower his future base sal-
ary. But if he exceeded his quota, he earned a $45 bonus for 
every extra Work Unit. 
3. The neurosurgeons’ alleged fraud and its effects on sal-
aries and revenues. This compensation structure gave the sur-
geons an incentive to maximize their Work Units. And the in-
centive seems to have worked. The surgeons reported doing 
more, and more complex, procedures. So the number of Work 
Units billed by the Neurosurgery Department more than dou-
bled between 2006 and 2009. 
Much of this increase allegedly stemmed from fraud. The 
relators accuse the surgeons of artificially boosting their Work 
Units: The surgeons said they acted as assistants on surgeries 
when they did not. They said they acted as teaching physicians 
when they did not. They billed for parts of surgeries that never 
happened. They did surgeries that were medically unnecessary 
or needlessly complex. And they did these things, say the rela-
tors, “[w]ith the full knowledge and endorsement of” the Med-
ical Center. App. 184 ¶ 190. 
Fraud can be profitable. And here it allegedly was. With 
these practices, the surgeons racked up lots of Work Units and 
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made lots of money. Most reported total Work Units that put 
them in the top 10% of neurosurgeons nationwide. And some 
received total pay that put them among the best-paid 10% of 
neurosurgeons in the country. 
The surgeons’ efforts proved profitable for the Medical 
Center too. The Medical Center made money off the surgeons’ 
work on some of the referrals. And to boot, healthcare provid-
ers bill Medicare for more than just the surgeons’ own Work 
Units. Whenever a surgeon did a procedure at one of the hos-
pitals, the Medical Center also got to bill “for the attendant hos-
pital and ancillary services.” App. 166 ¶ 104. This part of the 
bill could be four to ten times larger than the cost of the sur-
geon’s own services. So when the surgeons billed more, the 
Medical Center made more. “Indeed, in 2009,” the Neurosur-
gery Department “was the single highest grossing neurosurgi-
cal department in the United States, with Medicare charges 
alone of $58.6 million.” App. 163–64 ¶ 91. 
B. Procedural History 
The relators first filed suit in 2012. They alleged that the 
Medical Center, Pittsburgh Physicians, and a bevy of neurosur-
geons had submitted false claims for physician services and for 
hospital services to Medicare and Medicaid. Four years later, 
the United States intervened as to the claims for physician ser-
vices. The government settled those claims for about $2.5 mil-
lion. It declined to intervene as to the claims for hospital ser-
vices, but it let the relators maintain that part of the action in 
its stead. 
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After the government intervened, the District Court dis-
missed the first amended complaint without prejudice for fail-
ure to state a claim. The relators then filed their current com-
plaint, asserting three causes of action against the Medical 
Center and Pittsburgh Physicians under the False Claims Act:  
(1) one count of submitting false claims,  
(2) one count of knowingly making false records or state-
ments, and  
(3) one count of knowingly making false records or state-
ments material to an obligation to pay money to the 
United States. 
The District Court again dismissed for failure to state a claim, 
this time with prejudice. The relators now appeal.  
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PLEADING 
We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 
claim de novo. Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 
903 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2018). Our job is to gauge whether 
the complaint states a plausible claim to relief. Ashcroft v. Iq-
bal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plausible does not mean possi-
ble. If the allegations are “merely consistent with” misconduct, 
then they state no claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 557 (2007). There must be something in the complaint to 
suggest that the defendant’s alleged conduct is illegal. Id. at 
557. 
But plausible does not mean probable either. Our job is not 
to dismiss claims that we think will fail in the end. See id. at 
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556. Instead, we ask only if we have “enough fact[s] to raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” 
each element. Id. 
This is the baseline pleading standard for all civil actions. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684. But the relators allege 
claims for fraud. So they must also meet Rule 9(b)’s 
heightened pleading requirement. United States ex rel. Moore 
& Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 
306–07 (3d Cir. 2016). That rule says that a party alleging 
fraud “must state with particularity the circumstances consti-
tuting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  
III. THE STARK ACT AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
A. The Stark Act 
The Stark Act and its regulations broadly bar Medicare 
claims for many services referred by doctors who have a finan-
cial interest in the healthcare provider. But the statute creates 
dozens of exceptions and authorizes the Department of Health 
and Human Services to make even more exceptions for finan-
cial relationships that “do[ ]  not pose a risk of program or pa-
tient abuse.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(4). 
1. Forbidden conduct. The Stark Act opens with a broad 
ban. It forbids submitting Medicare claims for “designated 
health services” provided under a “referral” made by a doctor 
with whom the entity has a “financial relationship.” Id. 
§ 1395nn(a)(1). Understanding this ban requires exploring 
these three quoted terms, each of which has statutory and reg-
ulatory definitions. 
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The Stark Act lists several categories of designated health 
services, including inpatient hospital services. Id. 
§ 1395nn(h)(6)(K). And inpatient hospital services include bed 
and board, interns’ and residents’ services, nursing, drugs, sup-
plies, transportation, and overhead. 42 C.F.R. §§ 409.10(a), 
411.351. 
A referral is a doctor’s request for a designated health ser-
vice. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(5)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 411.351. That 
definition is broad, but it has an important exception: services 
that a doctor performs personally do not count. 42 C.F.R. 
§ 411.351. That makes sense; ordinarily, one cannot refer 
something to oneself. And the exception’s boundaries also fol-
low: it does not cover services by a doctor’s associates or em-
ployees, or services incidental to the doctor’s own services. Id.; 
Medicare Program; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care En-
tities with Which They Have Financial Relationships (Phase 
II); Interim Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 16054, 16063 (Mar. 26, 
2004). 
Finally, financial relationships come in two forms: 
(1) ownership or investment interests and (2) compensation ar-
rangements. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(2). This case turns on the 
latter. The statute defines compensation arrangement to mean 
“any arrangement involving any remuneration between” a doc-
tor and a healthcare provider. Id. § 1395nn(h)(1)(A). And re-
muneration “includes any remuneration, directly or indirectly, 
in cash or in kind.” Id. § 1395nn(h)(1)(B). 
2. Exceptions. On its face, the Stark Act’s ban sweeps in 
lots of common situations. To separate the wheat from the in-
nocuous chaff, Congress and the Department of Health and 
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Human Services have created many exceptions. Here, the 
Medical Center argues that exceptions for four types of com-
pensation arrangements could apply here: bona fide employ-
ment; personal services; fair-market-value compensation; and 
indirect compensation. See id. § 1395nn(e)(2), (e)(3); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 411.357(l), (p). 
All four exceptions have two elements in common. First, 
the doctor’s compensation must not “take[ ]  into account (di-
rectly or indirectly) the volume or value of” the doctor’s 
referrals. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2)(B)(ii); accord id. 
§ 1395nn(e)(3)(A)(v); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(l)(3), (p)(1)(i). Sec-
ond, the doctor’s compensation must not exceed fair market 
value. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2)(B)(i), (e)(3)(A)(v); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 411.357(l)(3), (p)(1)(i). 
In litigation, these exceptions are affirmative defenses. So 
once a plaintiff proves a prima facie violation of the Stark Act, 
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that an exception 
applies. United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 
554 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 2009). 
3. No built-in cause of action. The Stark Act forbids the 
government to pay claims that violate the Act. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395nn(g)(1). It demands restitution from those who receive 
payments on illegal claims. Id. § 1395nn(g)(2). And it creates 
civil penalties for submitting improper claims or taking part in 
schemes to violate the Act. Id. § 1395nn(g)(3), (4). But it gives 
no one a right to sue. United States ex rel. Drakeford v. 
Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 374 n.4 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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So the Stark Act never appears in court alone. Instead, it 
always come in through another statute that creates a cause of 
action—typically, the False Claims Act. 
B. The False Claims Act 
Under the False Claims Act, any person who “knowingly 
presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim 
for payment or approval” is civilly liable to the United States. 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). A Medicare claim that violates the 
Stark Act is a false claim under the False Claims Act. 
Kosenske, 554 F.3d at 94. The False Claims Act also makes 
liable anyone who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be 
made or used, a false record or statement material to” a false or 
fraudulent claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B), (G). 
IV. THE RELATORS PLEAD STARK ACT VIOLATIONS 
A prima facie Stark Act violation has three elements: (1) a 
referral for designated health services, (2) a compensation ar-
rangement (or an ownership or investment interest), and (3) a 
Medicare claim for the referred services. See United States ex 
rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2004). 
This combination of factors suggests potential abuse of Medi-
care. When they are all present, we let plaintiffs go to discov-
ery. 
Here, no one denies that the defendants made Medicare 
claims for designated health services. The issue is whether the 
complaint sufficiently alleges referrals and a compensation ar-
rangement. We hold that it does. The alleged Medicare abuse 
is plausible and deserves more scrutiny. 
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A. The surgeons referred designated health services to 
the hospitals 
The relators allege that “[e]very time [the neurosurgeons] 
performed a surgery or other procedure at the UPMC Hospi-
tals, [they] made a referral for the associated hospital claims.” 
App. 193 ¶ 234. They are right that these claims are referrals. 
As mentioned, the law defines referrals broadly. A referral 
is a doctor’s request for any designated health service that is 
covered by Medicare and provided by someone else. 42 C.F.R. 
§ 411.351. Designated health services include bed and board, 
some hospital overhead, nursing services, and much more. 42 
C.F.R. § 409.10(a). And the relators plead that as the surgeons 
performed more procedures, those procedures required (and 
the hospital provided and “increased billings for[)] the at-
tendant hospital and ancillary services including . . . hospital 
and nursing charges.” App. 166 ¶ 104 (emphasis added). So 
the plaintiffs plead that the surgeons referred designated health 
services to the hospitals. 
Treating these services as referrals makes sense. The Stark 
Act’s first step is to flag all potentially abusive arrangements. 
And doctors who generate profits for a hospital may be 
tempted to abuse their power, raising hospital bills as well as 
their own pay. These financial arrangements thus deserve a 
closer look. And they will get a closer look only if we call these 
arrangements what they are: doctors referring services to hos-
pitals. 
The Department of Health and Human Services agrees. In 
Phase I of its Stark Act rulemaking, it considered this point. It 
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determined that “any hospital service, technical component, or 
facility fee billed by [a] hospital in connection with [a doctor’s] 
personally performed service” counts as a referral. Medicare 
and Medicaid Programs; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care 
Entities with Which They Have Financial Relationships, 66 
Fed. Reg. 856, 941 (Jan. 4, 2001). This is true even “in the case 
of an inpatient surgery” where the doctor performs the surgery. 
Id. 
Then, in Phase II of its rulemaking, the agency revisited the 
question and considered narrower definitions. For instance, 
many commenters suggested excluding “services that are 
performed ‘incident to’ a physician’s personally performed 
services or that are performed by a physician’s employee” from 
the definition of a referral. 69 Fed. Reg. at 16063. 
But the agency reasonably rejected these suggestions. A 
narrower view, it reasoned, would all but swallow at least one 
statutory exception. Id. And it explained that the availability of 
that and other exceptions did enough to protect innocent con-
duct. Id. “[T]his interpretation is consistent with the statute as 
a whole,” which begins by casting a broad net to scrutinize all 
potential abuse. Id. 
B. The relators’ complaint alleges an indirect compen-
sation arrangement 
A referral is ripe for abuse only when the doctor who made 
it has a financial relationship with the provider. Only then can 
a doctor profit from his own referral. The financial relationship 
here is a compensation arrangement. 
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Compensation arrangements can be either direct or indirect. 
42 C.F.R. § 411.354(c). The hospitals did not pay the surgeons 
directly. So if there is any compensation arrangement here, it 
is indirect. That requires three elements: First, there must be 
“an unbroken chain . . . of persons or entities that have financial 
relationships” connecting the referring doctor with the provider 
of the referred services. Id. § 411.354(c)(2)(i). Second, the re-
ferring doctor must get “aggregate compensation . . . that varies 
with, or takes into account, the volume or value of referrals.” 
Id. § 411.354(c)(2)(ii). And third, the service provider must 
know, recklessly disregard, or deliberately ignore that the doc-
tor’s compensation “varies with, or takes into account, the vol-
ume or value of referrals.” Id. § 411.354(c)(2)(iii). (The parties 
do not challenge any of the regulations at issue, so we likewise 
assume that they are valid.) The complaint plausibly pleads 
enough facts to satisfy each element. 
1. An unbroken chain of entities with financial relation-
ships connects the surgeons with the hospitals. An unbroken 
chain of financial relationships links the surgeons to the hospi-
tals. First, the Medical Center owns each hospital. Second, the 
Medical Center also owns three entities: Pittsburgh Physicians, 
Community Medicine, and Tri-State. Third, each of these three 
entities employs and pays at least one of the surgeons. That 
adds up to an unbroken chain of financial relationships. Neither 
party disputes this. 
2. The surgeons’ suspiciously high compensation suggests 
that it took into account the volume and value of their referrals. 
Next, the relators allege that the surgeons’ aggregate compen-
sation varied with, and took into account, their referrals.  
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The parties disagree about what it means for compensation 
to vary with referrals. Appellants argue that varies with re-
quires only correlation. And compensation correlates with re-
ferrals here, they argue, because surgeons racked up more 
Work Units and earned more money by generating more refer-
rals. So the surgeons’ aggregate compensation allegedly varied 
with their referrals. Appellees, by contrast, deny that a correla-
tion suffices. Rather, they insist that the law requires some 
form of causation.  
We need not resolve the meaning of varies with here. Re-
gardless, the complaint plausibly alleges that the surgeons’ 
compensation takes into account the volume or value of their 
referrals. Under the Stark Act and its regulations, compensa-
tion takes into account referrals if there is a causal relationship 
between the two. And here, the surgeons’ suspiciously high 
compensation suggests causation. 
Compensation for personal services above the fair market 
value of those services can suggest that the compensation is 
really for referrals. This is just common sense. Healthcare pro-
viders would not want to lose money by paying doctors more 
than they bring in. They would do so only if they expected to 
make up the difference another way. And that way could be 
through the doctors’ referrals. 
This may not be obvious on the face of the statute and reg-
ulations. The Stark Act often treats fair market value as a con-
cept distinct from taking into account the volume or value of 
referrals. For example, these two concepts are separate ele-
ments of many Stark Act exceptions. E.g., 42 U.S.C. 
19 
§ 1395nn(e)(2) (bona fide employment), (e)(3) (personal ser-
vice); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(l) (fair-market-value compensa-
tion), (p) (indirect compensation). And the definition of an in-
direct compensation arrangement includes taking referrals into 
account, but not fair market value. 42 C.F.R. 
§ 411.354(c)(2)(ii). 
But the Act’s different treatment of these concepts does not 
sever them. To start, just because a statute has two elements 
does not mean that one can never be evidence of the other. 
Theft requires taking another’s property with intent. Those are 
two elements, but the fact of taking property can be circum-
stantial evidence of intent. 
So too here. Perhaps not all payments above fair market 
value are evidence of taking into account the doctor’s referrals. 
But common sense says that marked overpayments are a red 
flag. Anyone would wonder why the hospital would pay so 
much if it was not taking into account the doctor’s referrals for 
other services. And we do no violence to the statutory text by 
seeking an answer to that question. 
The agency confronted this question directly. It remarked 
that even “fixed aggregate compensation can form the basis for 
a prohibited . . . indirect compensation arrangement” if it “is in-
flated to reflect the volume or value of a physician’s referrals.” 
69 Fed. Reg. at 16059 (emphasis added). The same is true of 
“unit-of-service-based compensation arrangements,” like the 
one here. Id. Excessive compensation is thus a sign that a sur-
geon’s pay in fact takes referrals into account. 
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So aggregate compensation that far exceeds fair market 
value is smoke. It suggests that the compensation takes refer-
rals into account. And the relators here plead five facts that, 
viewed together, make plausible claims that the surgeons’ pay 
far exceeded their fair market value. First, some surgeons’ pay 
exceeded their collections. Second, many surgeons’ pay ex-
ceeded the 90th percentile of neurosurgeons nationwide. Third, 
many generated Work Units far above industry norms. Fourth, 
the surgeons’ bonus per Work Unit exceeded what the defend-
ants collected on most of those Work Units. And finally, the 
government alleged in its settlement agreement that the Medi-
cal Center had fraudulently inflated the surgeons’ Work Units. 
That much smoke makes fire plausible. 
a. Pay exceeding collections. Paying a worker more than 
he brings in is suspicious. And the complaint alleges that at 
least three surgeons (Drs. Bejjani, Spiro, and El-Kadi) were 
paid more than the Medical Center collected for their services. 
The complaint also alleges that the Medical Center credits sur-
geons with 100 percent of the Work Units that they generate, 
even if it cannot collect on all of them. So at least three sur-
geons (maybe more) were paid more than they bring in. 
b. Pay exceeding the 90th percentile. The relators allege 
that “[c]ompensation exceeding the 90th percentile is widely 
viewed in the industry as a ‘red flag’ indicating that it is in 
excess of fair market value.” App. 191 ¶ 223. The defendants 
do not deny this. 
Several surgeons were paid more than the 90th percentile. 
For example, the relators point to the compensation of Drs. 
Abla, Spiro, Kassam, and Bejjani between 2008 and 2011. 
21 
Apart from Dr. Spiro in 2008, each of these surgeons was paid 
more than even the highest estimate of the 90th percentile for 
all U.S. neurosurgeons in all four years. And depending on 
which estimate of the 90th percentile you use, they were some-
times paid two or three times more than the 90th percentile. Dr. 
Bejjani’s 2011 bonus alone exceeded the 90th percentile of to-
tal compensation in some surveys. 
c. Extreme Work Units. The relators also allege facts from 
which we can reasonably infer that the surgeons generated far 
more Work Units than normal. Many neurosurgeons “were 
routinely generating [Work Units] exceeding by an enormous 
margin the 90th percentile as reflected in widely-accepted mar-
ket surveys.” App. 171 ¶ 126. Even if we look only at the high-
est industry estimates, all but one of the surgeons reported 
Work Units above the 90th percentile in 2006 and 2007. In 
2008 and 2009, eight of the twelve named surgeons exceeded 
the highest estimate of the 90th percentile. A few even seemed 
“super human,” racking up two to three times the 90th percen-
tile. App. 169 ¶ 117.  
In short, most of the surgeons generated Work Units at or 
above the 90th percentile. Some of their numbers were unbe-
lievably high. And because their pay depends in large part on 
their Work Units, it is fair to infer that most of their pay was 
also at or above the 90th percentile.  
d. Bonuses exceeding the Medicare reimbursement rate. 
Once a surgeon had enough Work Units to earn bonus pay, the 
bonus per Work Unit was more than Medicare would pay for 
each one. The surgeons’ bonus per Work Unit was $45. But the 
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Medicare reimbursement rate was only about $35. So once sur-
geons became eligible for bonuses, the defendants took an im-
mediate loss on every Work Unit submitted to Medicare. 
On its own, this would not show that the surgeons were 
overpaid. Medicare and Medicaid are well known as bottom-
billers. They pay less than private insurers. Though the defend-
ants lost some money on Medicare Work Units, perhaps they 
made it back with Work Units billed to other insurers. 
But the relators also allege that “the majority of all claims 
submitted by the [defendants] . . . were submitted to federal 
health insurance programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.” 
App. 193 ¶ 233. We cannot assume that private payments suf-
fice to make up the difference. Doing so would disregard our 
job at this stage: to draw reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiffs.  
In short, the defendants took an immediate financial hit on 
Work Units for a majority of their claims. This is yet another 
sign that the surgeons’ pay took referrals into account. 
The defendants disagree. They argue that the surgeons earn 
high salaries because of bona fide bargaining with their em-
ployers. Their salaries supposedly represent the market’s de-
mand for their surgical skill and experience. 
This argument fails for two reasons. First, the complaint 
says nothing about the surgeons’ skill and experience or the 
Pittsburgh market for surgeons. On this motion to dismiss, we 
cannot go beyond the well-pleaded facts in the complaint. 
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Second, a bare claim of bona fide bargaining is not enough. 
The Stark Act recognizes that related parties often negotiate 
agreements “to disguise the payment of non-fair-market-value 
compensation.” Kosenske, 554 F.3d at 97. We trust that bona 
fide bargaining leads to fair market value only when neither 
party is “in a position to generate business for the other.” Id.; 
42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (defining “fair market value” and “general 
market value”). But that is not true here. The surgeons and the 
Medical Center can generate business for each other. So we 
cannot assume that any bargaining was bona fide or that the 
resulting pay was at fair market value. 
e. The possibility of fraud. Finally, the surgeons’ high pay 
may have been based on fudging the numbers. Not only were 
their individual Work Units “significantly out of line with in-
dustry benchmarks,” but the Neurosurgery Department as a 
whole realized astounding “annual growth rates of work 
[Units] . . . of 20.3%, 57.1% and 20.0%” in 2007, 2008, and 
2009. App. 171 ¶¶ 127–28. Two of the surgeons more than dou-
bled their output in just a few years. The relators allege that the 
defendants got this growth by “artificially inflat[ing] the num-
ber of [Work Units] in a number of ways.” App. 171 ¶ 130. 
Alleging this fraud, the relators’ first complaint included 
claims “relating to physician services submitted by” the de-
fendants along with the “hospital claims” currently before us. 
App. 189 ¶ 217 (emphases in original) The government chose 
to intervene as to the former claims, settling them with the de-
fendants for almost $2.5 million. 
The relators’ current complaint quotes that settlement 
agreement. In it, the government accused the surgeons of many 
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fraudulent practices: They claimed to have acted as assistants 
when they did not. They claimed to have done more extensive 
surgeries than they did. And they chose the wrong codes for 
surgeries. So “claims submitted for these physician services re-
sulted in more reimbursement than would have been paid” oth-
erwise. App. 188–89 ¶ 216. 
We are careful not to overstate the point. This settlement is 
not an admission of guilt. It proves no wrongdoing. But at the 
12(b)(6) stage, we are looking only for plausible claims, not 
proof of wrongs. And the government’s choice to intervene af-
ter years of investigation and its allegations in the settlement 
are cause for suspicion. 
The question is not whether a doctor was able to use an 
otherwise-valid compensation scheme as a vehicle for fraudu-
lent billing. Not every fraudulent Medicare bill made at a hos-
pital will give rise to a Stark Act violation. Here, however, 
where the compensation scheme produced results bordering on 
the absurd, relators plausibly assert that the system may have 
been designed with that outcome in mind. 
The relators allege five sets of facts that suggest that the 
surgeons’ pay far exceeded fair market value: pay exceeding 
collections, pay above the 90th percentile, extreme Work 
Units, bonuses above the Medicare reimbursement rate, and 
the settlement. That is plenty of smoke. We need not decide 
whether any of these allegations alone would satisfy the rela-
tors’ pleading burden. Together, they plausibly suggest that the 
surgeons’ pay took their referrals into account. Thus, the rela-
tors have pleaded more than enough facts to suggest an indirect 
compensation arrangement. 
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3. The hospitals knew that the surgeons’ compensation 
took their referrals into account. The final element of an 
indirect compensation arrangement is scienter. To show 
scienter, the relators’ pleadings must allege that the hospitals 
that provided the referred services either (1) knew, (2) deliber-
ately ignored, or (3) recklessly disregarded that the surgeons 
got “aggregate compensation that varie[d] with, or t[ook] into 
account, the volume or value of referrals.” 42 C.F.R. 
§ 411.354(c)(2)(iii). They allege this too. 
To begin, the Medical Center controls all the hospitals and 
the surgeons’ direct employers. It owns each hospital. And it 
owns Pittsburgh Physicians, Community Medicine, and Tri-
State. So the Medical Center “has unfettered authority with 
respect to most members of the [medical system] and signifi-
cant authority (including with respect to financial and tax mat-
ters) with respect to the remaining members.” App. 146–47 
¶ 19 (quoting a Medical Center tax filing).  
Further, many officers and board members of these entities 
overlapped. For example, one person simultaneously served as 
an executive vice president of the Medical Center as well as 
the president and a board member of Pittsburgh Physicians. 
And he signed surgeons’ pay agreements for Pittsburgh Physi-
cians. The relators identify nine others who served on the board 
of both the Medical Center and another entity in the medical 
system. Authority was so centralized that a single person 
signed a settlement agreement on behalf of all the defendants 
that were part of the medical system. And with common con-
trol comes common knowledge. 
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The common knowledge included both the surgeons’ pay 
and their referrals. The Medical Center took part in forming, 
approving, and implementing the surgeons’ pay packages. So 
it knew their structure. The Medical Center also had a central 
coding and billing department that handled billing for its sub-
sidiaries. So it knew about the surgeons’ referrals. 
With both sets of data in front of it, we can plausibly infer 
that the Medical Center knew the surgeons’ compensation took 
their referrals into account. And as the Medical Center knew 
that, so did the hospitals. They had all the data right in front of 
them. They knew that the surgeons’ pay and Work Units were 
out of line with industry survey data. Even if they did not 
actually know that the surgeons’ pay and work levels were sus-
piciously high, they at least deliberately ignored or recklessly 
disregarded that fact. Thus, the complaint alleges that both the 
Medical Center and hospitals had scienter.  
* * * * * 
This means that the relators have successfully pleaded the 
third and final element of a Stark Act violation: scienter. But 
they must plead one more thing to survive a motion to dismiss. 
We must now consider whether the relators have pleaded a 
plausible prima facie case under the False Claims Act. 
V. THE RELATORS PLEAD FALSE CLAIMS ACT  
VIOLATIONS 
The relators plead their Stark Act claims as violations of the 
False Claims Act. So their pleadings must satisfy all the ele-
ments of the False Claims Act. They do. And they satisfy Rule 
9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. Last, we hold that the 
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Stark Act’s exceptions are not additional elements of a prima 
facie case. But even if they were, the relators have plausibly 
pleaded that no exception applies here.  
A. The pleadings satisfy all three elements of the False 
Claims Act 
To make out a prima facie case, the relators must plead 
three elements: “ ‘(1) the defendant presented or caused to be 
presented to an agent of the United States a claim for payment; 
(2) the claim was false or fraudulent; and (3) the defendant 
knew the claim was false or fraudulent.’ ” Schmidt, 386 F.3d at 
242 (quoting Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 
F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2001)). They have alleged enough facts 
to plead all three elements.  
First, by submitting claims to Medicare and other federal 
health programs, the defendants presented claims for payment 
to the government.  
Second, the relators allege that these claims were false. A 
Medicare claim that violates the Stark Act is a false claim. 
Kosenske, 554 F.3d at 94. And we have already explained at 
length why the Medicare claims here plausibly violated the 
Stark Act. 
Third, the relators’ allegations plead scienter. Just like the 
Stark Act, the False Claims Act requires that the defendants 
know, deliberately ignore, or recklessly disregard the falsity of 
their claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A). But it does not require 
a specific intent to defraud. Id. § 3729(b)(1)(B). 
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The claims are false because they allegedly violated the 
Stark Act. The question is whether the defendants at least reck-
lessly disregarded that possibility. The defendants had a cen-
tralized billing department and were familiar with the Stark Act 
itself, so they knew that they submitted Medicare claims for 
referred designated health services. That leaves only whether 
the defendants knew that the hospitals and surgeons had an in-
direct compensation agreement. 
The complaint alleges that the defendants at least recklessly 
disregarded that possibility. They knew their own corporate 
structure. We have already explained how they knew or reck-
lessly disregarded that the surgeons’ pay varied with their re-
ferrals. And we have also explained how they knew or reck-
lessly disregarded that their surgeons’ pay far exceeded fair 
market value and thus plausibly took referrals into account. So 
the relators have pleaded a prima facie claim under the False 
Claims Act. 
B. The pleadings satisfy Rule 9(b) 
The relators’ complaint also satisfies Rule 9(b)’s particu-
larity requirement. To do so, the allegations must go well be-
yond Rule 8’s threshold of plausibility. A mere plausible infer-
ence of illegality is not enough. Instead, “a relator must ‘estab-
lish a “strong inference” that the false claims were submitted.’ ” 
United States ex rel. Silver v. Omnicare, Inc., 903 F.3d 78, 92 
(3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., 754 
F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 2014)). 
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Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement requires a plaintiff to 
allege “ ‘all of the essential factual background that would ac-
company the first paragraph of any newspaper story—that is, 
the who, what, when, where, and how of the events at issue.’ ” 
Majestic Blue Fisheries, 812 F.3d at 307 (quoting In re Rock-
efeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Secs. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 
2002)). The complaint gives us all these necessary details: 
• Who? The defendants: the Medical Center and Pitts-
burgh Physicians. 
• What? The defendants submitted or caused to be 
submitted false Medicare claims. 
• When? From 2006 until now. 
• Where? The Medicare claims were submitted from 
the Medical Center’s centralized billing facility, 
while the referred services were provided at the 
Medical Center’s twenty hospitals. 
• How? When the Medical Center submitted a claim, 
it certified compliance with the Stark Act. The com-
plaint makes all the allegations discussed above. We 
will not repeat them. But they detail exactly how 
these claims violated the Stark Act. 
Rule 9(b) does not require the relators to plead anything 
more, such as the date, time, place, or content of every single 
allegedly false Medicare claim. The falsity here comes not 
from a particular misrepresentation, but from a set of circum-
stances that, if true, makes a whole set of claims at least prima 
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facie false. It is enough to allege those circumstances with par-
ticularity. Doing so “inject[s] precision or some measure of 
substantiation into [the] fraud allegation” and “place[s] the de-
fendant on notice of the precise misconduct with which [it is] 
charged.” Alpizar-Fallas v. Favero, 908 F.3d 910, 919 (3d Cir. 
2018) (quoting Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200 
(3d Cir. 2007)) (last alteration in original; internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
And the relators have done so. The second amended com-
plaint runs 57 pages (plus exhibits) and comprises 257 num-
bered paragraphs. Dozens of these paragraphs go into great de-
tail about specific physicians’ Work Units and pay levels. The 
complaint compares those figures at length with industry 
benchmarks, medians, and 90th percentiles. It alleges specific 
ways that surgeons padded their bills, by for instance falsely 
reporting unperformed work assisting other surgeons or phys-
ically supervising residents and interns. The complaint also 
quotes the government’s settlement agreement, alleging spe-
cific ways that surgeons had been padding their bills. The sum 
total of these allegations tells a detailed story about how the 
defendants designed a system to reward surgeons for creating 
and submitting false claims. See Omnicare, 903 F.3d at 91–92 
(quoting Foglia, 754 F.3d at 158). And that is particular 
enough to satisfy Rule 9(b). 
C. Pleading Stark Act exceptions under the False 
Claims Act 
One final issue is how the Stark Act interacts with the False 
Claims Act. The defendants argue that the False Claims Act’s 
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elements of falsity and knowledge turn the Stark Act’s excep-
tions into prima facie elements of the False Claims Act. On 
their reading, the relators would have to plead that no exception 
applies here. 
We reject that argument. The defendants retain the burden 
of pleading Stark Act exceptions even under the False Claims 
Act. And even if the relators bore that burden, they have met it 
here. 
1. The burden of pleading Stark Act exceptions stays with 
the defendant under the False Claims Act. The defendants ar-
gue that the False Claims Act’s knowledge and falsity elements 
turn the Start Act’s exceptions into prima facie elements. Their 
logic is simple and cogent: The False Claims Act penalizes 
only false claims. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). False claims include 
claims submitted in violation of the Stark Act. See Kosenske, 
554 F.3d at 94. But if an exception to the Stark Act applies, 
then the claim is not false. And if the defendant thinks that an 
exception applies, then the defendant does not know that the 
claim is false. So, according to the defendants, to plead a False 
Claims Act claim based on Stark Act violations, a relator must 
plead that no Stark Act exception applies and that the defend-
ant knows that none applies. Otherwise, the relator pleads nei-
ther falsity nor knowledge. 
Though this argument has force, we reject it. Our precedent 
compels this result. Like this case, Kosenske was a False 
Claims Act case based on Stark Act violations. Id. It placed the 
burden of proving a Stark Act exception on the defendant. Id. 
at 95; accord Tuomey, 792 F.3d at 374. And we see no reason 
to split up the burdens of pleading and persuasion. It is thus the 
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defendants’ burden to plead a Stark Act exception, not the re-
lators’ burden to plead that none exists. 
2. Even if the relators bore this pleading burden, they have 
met it. In any event, the relators here plausibly plead that no 
Stark Act exception applies. The parties identify four that 
could apply here: exceptions for bona fide employment, per-
sonal services, fair-market-value pay, and indirect compensa-
tion. All four exceptions require that the surgeons’ compensa-
tion not exceed fair market value and not take into account the 
volume or value of referrals. 
We have already explained how the relators plausibly plead 
that the surgeons were paid more than fair market value. And 
that itself suggests that their pay may take into account their 
referrals’ volume or value. So the relators plausibly plead that 
no Stark Act exception applies.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Evaluating a motion to dismiss is “a context-specific task 
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experi-
ence and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Our experi-
ence and common sense tell us that the relators state a plausible 
claim that the Medical Center and Pittsburgh Physicians have 
violated the Stark Act and the False Claims Act. 
The facts they plead, if true, satisfy every element of those 
statutes: A chain of financial relationships linked the hospitals 
to the surgeons. The surgeons referred many designated health 
services to the hospitals, generating ancillary hospital services 
and facility fees. It is plausible that their pay takes into account 
the volume of those referrals. The hospitals made Medicare 
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claims for those referrals. And the defendants allegedly knew 
all this. 
With all this smoke, a fire is plausible. So this case deserves 
to go to discovery. Once the discovery is in, it may turn out that 
there is no fire. We do not prejudge the merits. But this is ex-
actly the kind of situation on which the Stark and False Claims 
Acts seek to shed light. We will thus reverse the District 
Court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings.  
